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ABSTRACT
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a mobile network formed by vehicles, roadside
units, and other infrastructures that enable communication between the nodes to improve
road safety and traffic control. While this technology promises great benefits to drivers, it
has many security concerns that are critical to road safety. It is essential to ensure that only
authenticated vehicles transmit data and revoked vehicles do not interfere in this
communication. Many current VANET technologies also depend on a central trusted
authority that can cost computation and communication overhead and be a single point of
failure for the network. By using blockchain technology in VANET, we can take advantage
of the decentralized and distributed framework and thereby avoid a single point of trust.
Moreover, blockchain technology ensures the immutability of the data strengthening the
integrity of the system. In the proposed framework, Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned
blockchain technology, is used for identity management in VANET. All the vehicles with
their pseudo IDs are registered, validated, and revoked using the blockchain technology.
The vehicles in the network check the validity of the safety messages received from the
neighboring nodes, using the services provided by the road side units that have access to
the blockchain. This framework works on looking-up the pseudo IDs and public keys on
the blockchain for their validity, thus promising a light-weight authentication and reduced
computation and communication overhead for vehicles to access the safety messages in the
network.
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Chapter 1

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
As accounted by the Global status report on road safety 2018, released by the World Health
Organization (WHO) [1], the annual road traffic accidents have claimed the lives of 1.35
million people. WHO has also recognized road traffic accidents and injuries as the leading
killer of people in the 5-29 age group. In 2017, the Canadian Automobile Association
(CAA) had identified that drivers in Canada collectively spend over 11.5 million hours and
use 22 million liters of fuel per year due to traffic congestion [2]. The technology of
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) will be able to mitigate road accidents and traffic
congestion.

VANET is a mobile network formed by vehicles, road-side units (RSUs), and other
infrastructures. In VANET, vehicles have an on-board unit (OBU) that transmits the state
of the vehicles to the other vehicles around it. The RSUs are infrastructures present on the
side of the road that help the vehicles to communicate with each other. VANET supports
comfort applications and safety applications [3]. Comfort applications provide features like
weather information systems, gas/restaurant location, and price details, whereas safety
applications support emergency warning systems, lane-changing assistance, and
intersection coordination.
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Figure 1.1 Vehicular Ad Hoc Network [4]

Figure 1.1 shows the communication between the vehicles and the RSUs. Communication
in VANET can be Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Infrastructure
to Infrastructure (I2I), or V2X – vehicle to any other internet-enabled device [5]. In the
United States, IEEE has adopted the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
standard – providing seven 10 MHz channels at 5.9 GHz licensed bandwidth [3]. Vehicular
communication is enabled using Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE)
IEEE 1609 family that provides the necessary protocols and services [6]. IEEE 1609.2
standard provides the methods to ensure the security of WAVE messages and the
anonymity and privacy of vehicles.

Security and privacy are a few of the main challenges in VANET. It is essential to ensure
that only authenticated vehicles transmit valid messages; otherwise, it can adversely affect
the lives of the drives or incur a substantial financial loss. According to [5] attacks in
VANET can be:
•

Active vs. passive – based on the attacking method; if the attacker performs some
malicious action then the attack is active. Otherwise, if the attacker silently listens
to the network then it is a passive attack.
2

•

Internal vs. external – based on the membership of the attacker; internal attacks are
done by authenticated nodes of the network while external attacks are conducted
by nodes that are external to the network.

•

Rational vs. malicious – based on the motivation of the attacker; rational attackers
try to disrupt the network for their personal benefit, whereas the motive of
malicious attackers is to bring harm to the network.

In [5], Abassi et al. has recognized some of the main security requirements in VANET as
the following:
•

Data integrity – ensuring that the exchanged messages are not altered or modified
by an attacker

•

Authentication of vehicles – identifying valid vehicles and ensuring that they are
who they claim to be

•

Privacy and anonymity of vehicles – ensuring that private information of the
vehicles is not disclosed to others and not trackable by the attacker

•

Vehicle ID traceability – required for non-repudiation to retrieve the identity of the
vehicles

•

Access control – granting the right access to data and services for different entities
in the network

•

Revocability – required for identifying misbehaving vehicles and revoking them

•

Network availability – ensuring that the network is always accessible

•

Network scalability – ability to add other nodes to the network without affecting
the performance

Hence, we have used blockchain technology to achieve some of these security
requirements, like authentication of vehicles. Blockchain was first introduced by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008 [7], as Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Blockchain technology supports a
decentralized and distributed framework and uses cryptography to store data in an
3

immutable fashion on a shared ledger. It is deployed on a peer to peer network and uses
smart contracts/chain codes to interact with different applications. Some of the earlier
blockchain technologies are Bitcoin and Ethereum. These are public/permissionless
blockchains where the participants of the network do not trust each other. Now we have
private/permissioned blockchains, where additional security is added by controlling the
nodes that can form the blockchain network. Using blockchain will have added advantage
like providing better traceability as each change in the blockchain can be easily tracked,
better network availability as the participants can access the most updated ledger from other
peers if its ledger is tampered by an attacker. However, the main focus in our research is to
manage the authentication of vehicles in VANET.

1.2 Motivation
Managing the identity of vehicles is a significant challenge in VANET. Further, the current
approaches use public key infrastructure (PKI) [8], [9], where each vehicle is assigned a
public key and a private key by a Central Authority (CA). These private keys are used to
generate digital signatures that will authenticate messages sent by vehicles in the network.
Further, each vehicle is provided the public key of the CA and a certificate that contains
the public key that is digitally signed by the CA. The receiving vehicles will first verify the
digital signature of the certificate with the public key of CA and retrieve the public key of
the sending vehicle. Then, this public key will be used to verify the digital signature of the
message that is received.

However, these approaches are not efficient in VANET as each vehicle approximately
sends a basic safety message (BSM) every 100ms [10] and some of these critical messages
will not be authenticated due to the encryption-decryption latency occurred during the
narrow time period that they are required the most. As discussed in [8] by Liu et al.,
authentication based on digital signatures involve more computational overhead for
4

encryption and decryption processes. From the results in [11], we see that more time is
required for processing messages using PKI in VANET.

Hence, we need to have an efficient framework for registering, authenticating, updating,
and revoking vehicle IDs. The main objective of my research is to provide a secure and
light-weight authentication framework using permissioned blockchain [12] and to manage
the identities of the vehicles in the network. Vehicles access the road-side units (RSUs) to
validate the pseudo IDs and public keys of other vehicles. The road-side units use the
blockchain to have an easy look-up of the pseudo IDs and public keys of valid vehicles.
Further, we reduce the computational overhead in the network using a decentralized and
distributed framework. Using blockchain will enable us to avoid dependence on a central
authority, hence, preventing denial-of-service attacks and a single point of failure.

1.3 Problem Definition
The technology of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is instrumental in improving road
safety and managing traffic control. However, VANETs have many security concerns that
can adversely affect the system, incurring financial loss, and costing lives. Currently, the
authentication framework for VANET is maintained using public key infrastructure (PKI)
where public and private keys are assigned to vehicles. Each message sent by a vehicle has
that vehicle’s digital signature and a certificate that is digitally signed by the Central
Authority (CA), which further requires additional computation by other vehicles for
authenticating the sender. Moreover, each vehicle sends a basic safety message every
100ms [10]. The delay in PKI framework for encryption and decryption will affect the
performance of the system. Thus, by implementing PKI for authenticating vehicles, the
efficiency of the system is affected due to more computational overhead.

5

Blockchain is a promising future for VANET. It supports a decentralized and distributed
framework for the system. A decentralized system will remove the dependence on a central
authority to perform important tasks like registering vehicles, revoking vehicle IDs and
updating the identities of the vehicles. Moreover, it helps in mitigating single point of
failure. Further, having a distributed system will ensure that we have proper backup in case
one of the participants is unavailable or if the participant is attacked and loses its data. In
this thesis, we aim to provide a secure and computationally efficient authentication
mechanism for validating the identities of vehicles sending messages. Here, we have used
the PKI framework along with blockchain and used the pseudo IDs and public keys of the
vehicles to authenticate them in the network. The pseudo IDs and public keys of the
vehicles are stored in the blockchain ledger. The road-side units (RSUs) will have access
to the blockchain and can perform a fast look-up to get the pseudo IDs and public keys of
valid vehicles. Hence, vehicles can easily authenticate other vehicles by requesting the
services from the nearby RSUs.

1.4 Solution Outline
In this thesis, we have proposed a light-weight authentication framework using blockchain
for VANET. We have many participants in this network like: authentication parties, roadside units (RSUs) and vehicles. The authentication parties are responsible for registering
vehicles and providing them with pseudo IDs, public keys and private keys. They are also
responsible for updating the pseudo IDs, public keys and private keys of the vehicles,
revoking them if the vehicles misbehave and maintaining the list of valid vehicles in the
network. The RSUs are responsible for assisting the vehicles in authenticating the messages
sent by other vehicles and reporting any misbehaving vehicles to the authentication parties.

We use Hyperledger Fabric [13], a permissioned blockchain, to maintain and validate the
identities of the vehicles. In a permissioned blockchain, each participant joining the
6

network will be trusted. The participants will be connected to each other through public
key infrastructure (PKI). Each participant will maintain a shared ledger that is distributed
amongst all the participants. The authentication parties and RSUs have access to the
blockchain based on the access control provided to each participant. The RSUs can perform
a quick look-up to the ledger to validate the vehicles, and hence, the vehicles will access
the nearby RSUs to validate the messages received from other vehicles. This framework
supports security features like authentication, access control, revocability, and network
availability. Finally, we will simulate this framework and focus on the delay that is caused
due to the authentication scheme, and the channel busy time, and compare it to that of the
traditional PKI framework. Thus, we can study how the blockchain will affect the
performance in VANET.

1.5 Thesis Organization

The rest of the thesis work is organized in the following manner: In chapter 2, we discuss
the related work/literature review in managing the identities of the vehicles in Vehicular
Ad-Hoc Network using blockchain. In chapter 3, we explain our proposed method to
manage the identities of the vehicles using pseudo IDs, public keys and blockchain
(Hyperledger Fabric). In Chapter 4, we present the simulation setup and results with its
assumptions and analyze the result. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the research by explaining
the insights received during the thesis work and discussing a few of the future works in this
field.
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Chapter 2

2. Literature Review
2.1 Background on VANET
2.1.1 Introduction

Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a form of mobile ad-hoc network where vehicles
are connected to each other. In this type of network, each vehicle has an on-board unit
(OBU) that will assist in wireless communication with other vehicles [5]. This network has
road side units (RSUs) that are responsible for relaying information over a specified area.
However, VANETs are different from mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) in the
following, as recognized by Yousefi et al. in [3]:
•

VANET changes its topology quickly as the nodes are mobile and they commute
at high speed.

•

VANET has no power or battery restriction unlike MANET where the sensors or
other devices have limited power supply.

•

VANET can have a large-scale network span especially in cities and highways with
more vehicles.

In VANETs, there are mainly four types of communication as below [5]:
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•

Vehicle to vehicle (V2V) – where one vehicle sends messages to the other vehicles

•

Vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) – where a vehicle sends messages to RSU or vice
versa

•

Infrastructure to infrastructure (I2I) – where infrastructures communicate to one
another in the back end to provide services

•

Vehicle to X (V2X) – where vehicle communicates to other internet enabled
devices

There are mainly 2 types of applications supported in VANET – safety applications and
comfort applications [3]. While comfort applications support features like weather
information, near-by gas stations or restaurants and other services that improve passenger
comfort, safety application mainly focus on enhancing the safety of the passengers. Safety
applications include services like providing emergency warning system, lane change
assistance and road condition alerts. Many accidents and road side traffic can be avoided
using the safety applications in VANET.

Safety applications has two types of messages: event-driven and periodic safety messages
[3]. Event-driven messages are generated at the occurrence of an emergency event like an
accident or other unsafe situations. Periodic safety messages are beacon messages that are
send from a vehicle at fixed intervals. These messages will include the state of the sending
vehicle like the position, speed, direction and other parameters. These messages are
important for the vehicle to understand its surroundings.

2.1.2 VANET Standards

The standards used in VANET will affect the communication from the physical layer to
the application layer as in Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. According to [6],
9

there are mainly three standards used; Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC),
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) and IEEE 802.11p.

Figure 2.1 DSRC in USA with 7 channels [6]

Figure 2.2 DSRC in Europe with 5 channels [6]

In United States, the Federal Communication Commission has dedicated seven 10 MHz
channels for Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC). This band ranges from 5850
to 5925 GHz as shown in Figure 2.1 [6]. The channel 178 is a Control Channel (CCH) that
is used for advertising services on service channels [14]. The other six channels are Service
Channels (SCH). The channel 172 is exclusively dedicated for V2V safety communication
and accident avoidance and channel 184 is dedicated for high-power, longer-distance
communication for public safety applications. However, in Europe, the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has dedicated five channels of 10 MHz
with channel 180 for CCH and channels 172, 174, 176 and 178 for SSH. This is shown in
Figure 2.2 [6].
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Figure 2.3 WAVE architecture [6]

The Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) IEEE 1609 family specifies the
set of protocols, services and interfaces required for intervehicle communication [6]. This
architecture will control the Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communications. Following are some of the main standards included in the WAVE 1609
family as shown in Figure 2.3 [6]:
•

IEEE 1609.1 (Resource Manager): this standard defines the data formats for
storage, data flows, resources, and the devices that can be supported by the OnBoard Units.

•

IEEE 1609.2 (Security Services for Applications and Management Messages): this
standard specifies the functions that are required for securing the messages in
WAVE and DSRC systems. Further, it supports vehicle anonymity and privacy.

•

IEEE 1609.3 (Network Services): defines the services for Network and Transport
layers and describes the WAVE Short Message (WSM) protocol.
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•

IEEE 1609.4 (Multi-Channel Operation): describes the services for multi-channel
operation; including Control Channel and Service Channel operations.

•

IEEE 1609.5 (Layer Management): this standard is still under development and will
aim at managing V2V and V2I communication in WAVE systems.

•

IEEE 1609.6 (Remote Management Services): this standard is also under
development and aims at supporting the identification of OBU and RSU.

Further, the IEEE 802.11p family provides protocols and services that support intervehicle
communication. This standard specifies the definitions for physical and media access
control layers for vehicular networks [6].

2.1.3 Security in VANET

Security is one of the main challenges in VANET as it will affect human lives and result
in huge financial loss. VANET is prone to attacks as it operates on wireless media for
communication. Moreover, the data sent across the network can be used by attackers for
tracking the drivers of the vehicles. As mentioned in section 1.1, there are many attacker
profiles including active vs passive, internal vs. external, and rational vs. malicious.
Further, based on the scope of the attacks, it can be a local attack or a global attack. In local
attacks, the affected area is limited, whereas in global attacks, the attack affects many nodes
in the network, covering a large area [5].

Some of the main security requirements are mentioned in section 1.1, which include
authentication of vehicles, data integrity, privacy and anonymity of vehicles, providing
access control, ID traceability, revocability of misbehaving vehicles, network scalability
and availability. In [5] Abassi et al. have mentioned other security requirements that are
essential for VANET. They are:
12

•

Confidentiality: ensuring that only authenticated nodes can access the messages in
the network

•

Nonrepudiation: ensuring that the sender of a message cannot deny sending that
message

These security requirements are essential to mitigate the attacks that VANETs are
susceptible to. In [5] Abassi et al. have recognized four main types of attacks in VANET.
They are:
•

Confidentiality attacks: these attacks occur when an unauthenticated node has
access to the messages being transmitted in the network. Eavesdropping is an
example of this type of an attack.

•

Integrity attacks: these attacks aim at affecting the validity and usefulness of a
message. Examples of this type of attack include message tampering, illusion
attacks and timing attacks. In message tampering, the attacker modifies the V2V or
V2I messages; in illusion attacks the attacker alters the sensors of the vehicle to
transmit erroneous messages in the network and in timing attacks the messages are
deliberately delayed thus preventing crucial messages from being transmitted.

•

Authentication and privacy attacks: these types of attacks occur when
unauthenticated vehicles access messages in the network or when the private
information related to a vehicle is tracked [15]. Examples of this type of attacks
include sybil attack, impersonation attack, location tracking and identity revealing
attacks. In sybil attack, the attacker assumes multiple identities and transmits false
messages to legitimate users. In impersonation attacks, the attacker pretends like
one of the authenticated vehicles and sends messages. In privacy attacks like
location tracking attacks, the attacker builds the vehicle profile by tracking the path
of a vehicle and in identity revealing attacks, the attacker gains the owner’s or the
driver’s identity and may get access to their personal data.

•

Availability attacks: these types of attack aim at disrupting the services of VANET
and making the network unavailable for use. Examples of this type of attack include
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denial of service (DoS) attacks, spamming and black hole attacks [16]. In DoS
attacks, the entire channel is jammed, and authenticated vehicles cannot access the
services of the network. Spamming attacks occur when a spam message is broadcast
to the other vehicles increasing the delay of the other transmitted messages and
rendering the network unavailable. Black hole attacks occur when the attacker
refuses to communicate with other vehicles or communicate using false messages.

In our research, the focus is to manage the authentication aspect of VANET. Here, each
vehicle is required to validate the sender of each basic safety message (BSM) to ensure that
the sender is authentic and not an attacker.

2.2 VANET Authentication
The current state of art uses the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for managing the identities
of the vehicles in the network [8] and [17]. Each vehicle in the network will have a public
key and a private key assigned to them by a Central Authority (CA). When the vehicles
register with the regional authority or the national authority, the OBUs of the vehicles are
loaded with sets of public and private keys. Public keys (PK) are visible to all the nodes in
the network, while private keys (SK) are only known to the node that it is assigned to and
is kept as a secret. Also, during registration, the CA will assign a certificate (Cert) and
provide its public key (PKCA) to the vehicles. The certificate will contain the public key
(PKV) of the vehicle V and the digital signature of the public key using the CA’s private
key (SKCA) as shown in equation 2.1 [17]. The signature also contains the identity of the
CA, i.e. IDCA.

𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑉 = 𝑃𝐾𝑉 | 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑆𝐾𝐶𝐴 [𝑃𝐾𝑉 | 𝐼𝐷𝐶𝐴 ]
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2.1

When a basic safety message is being transmitted in the network, the sender of the message
computes the digital signature of the message using its private key. Then, the digital
signature of the message and the certificate of the vehicle is transmitted along with the
basic safety message (BSM). To validate the sender of the message, the receiving vehicle
will have to first verify the certificate attached along with the message. This is done using
the public key of the CA (PKCA) that was loaded at the time if registration. After verifying
the certificate, the sender’s public key is obtained and further used to verify the digital
signature of the message. If verified successfully, then the sender of the message is
authenticated. In [17] Raya et al. represents the communication from a vehicle as below:

𝑉 → 𝑀 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑆𝐾𝑉 [𝑀 | 𝑇] , 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑉

2.2

In equation 2.2, V represents the vehicle sending the message M, at timestamp T. | is used
to concatenate the message M with the timestamp T, to ensure that recent messages are
being transmitted. SignSKv represents the digital signature of the vehicle V using its private
key, SKV. CertV is the certificate of the vehicle V that was loaded on the OBU of the
vehicles during registration. The receivers of the message will have to verify CertV and
then use the public key obtained to verify the digital signature of the message.

In Figure 2.4, we see that the regional CAs are connected to the national CA. The regional
CAs are responsible for registering vehicles by providing public/private key pairs to the
vehicles. Further, they are responsible for renewing the digital certificates and revoking
them in case a misbehaving vehicle is detected.

15

Figure 2.4 PKI Architecture [18]

2.3 Background on Blockchain
The technology of blockchain was first introduced in 2008 by Nakamoto Satoshi as a backend for peer-to-peer cryptocurrency – Bitcoin [7]. This technology works in a decentralized
way, where the data is stored in a shared ledger. This data is cryptographically signed so
that the ledger is immutable and can be traced back to the start.

As shown in Figure 2.5, the blockchain technology is similar to that of a physical ledger
that will maintain the financial details [19]. Just like the pages of the ledger are connected
to each other by page numbers, each block in a blockchain will be cryptographically
connected to the previous block. This is done using hash functions. In hash functions, data
of any size is taken as input and converted to a hash value of a fixed size. This is a oneway function in that it is infeasible or nearly impossible to retrieve the input data from the
hash value. In a blockchain, each block contains the hash of the previous block [19].
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Blockchain is different from traditional databases in that it only supports appending
information to it and that data cannot be deleted, hence ensuring more transparency.

Figure 2.5 Structure of a Blockchain [19]

As shown in Figure 2.6, in a distributed ledger each participant of the network maintains a
copy of the ledger. To add a new block to the ledger, all the participants will have to verify
the new block, reach a common consensus, and then update their ledger. In blockchains,
majority of the nodes need to agree on the new block, to achieve the consensus and to add
the block [20]. Some of the popular consensus mechanisms used in blockchains are Proof
of Work, Proof of Stake, and Proof of Authority [21], [7].

Thus, if any one of the participants is unavailable due to system failure or DoS attack, the
other participants will still be providing services. Once the participant that was down, has
resumed its services, it can gain access to the latest ledger by requesting it from one of the
other participants [19].

17

Figure 2.6 Distributed ledger in Blockchain

Currently, there are two types of blockchains: public blockchains like Bitcoins [22],
Ethereum [23] and private blockchains like Hyperledger Fabric [13].

2.3.1 Public Blockchain

In public blockchains, any node can join the network and choose to become a miner [12].
Miners are the nodes that validate the new blocks. This is done by competing to solve a
cryptographically hard problem. As a reward for mining the new block, the miners will
receive an incentive. The nodes in public blockchain can choose to remain in the network
or exit out anytime they want. They can also re-enter the network and gain access to the
latest ledger. Hence, the data in a public blockchain is available to any node that joins the
network [20]. Examples of public blockchains are Bitcoins [22] and Ethereum [23].
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2.3.2 Private Blockchain

Currently, various enterprises use permissioned or private blockchains that confirm the
identity of the participants of the network. Hence, these types of blockchains do not need
to assume that the participants of the network cannot be trusted. In this type of blockchain,
only authorized participants with delegated access can join the network [20]. Examples of
this type of blockchain will include Hyperledger [13] and Ripple [24].

Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain developed by Linux Foundation [13]. It
has two components in its ledger: World State – that stores the state of the assets and
Transaction Log – that stores the entire log of transactions. It supports Byzantine Fault
Tolerance [25] through consensus mechanisms like SOLO, Kafka, or Raft [13]. It supports
smart contracts/chain code in different programming languages like Go and Node. Smart
contracts are the code that provide controlled ledger access, and they are automatically
executed for transactions [26].

2.3.3 Consensus Mechanisms

Blockchains use consensus mechanisms to ensure that the same state of the ledger is
maintained across all the participants of the network. This is crucial in a decentralized
system. As discussed in [21], some of the consensus mechanisms used in blockchains are:
•

Proof of Work (PoW): This consensus algorithm requires a participant node to
prove that the work done by that node qualifies them to add the transaction to the
blockchain. The node that does the work is called miner. The miners compete to
solve a cryptographically hard problem and the first node to solve it receives
incentives for the work done. This consensus mechanism requires high
computational energy and processing time.
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•

Proof of Stake (PoS): In this consensus algorithm, the participant node that verifies
transaction is selected based on the value of the asset that they place at stake. This
mechanism is more energy efficient and fast compared to PoW.

•

Proof of Authority (PoA): Here, the validators are provided incentive to maintain
their reputation or authority to ensure that they are not compromised. This
consensus mechanism is a variation of PoS, where the asset at stake is the authority
of the validator [27].

2.4 Using Blockchains in VANET for Authentication
Blockchain is an emerging technology and various use cases of blockchain are being
explored. Using blockchain in VANET for authorization is an upcoming research field.
Many researchers have used different types of blockchains (public and private) to secure
the messages, provide authentication mechanism for vehicles, and to transition the VANET
system into a decentralized and distributed framework. Some of these approaches are
discussed below.

In [28] Leiding et al. have used Ethereum, a permissionless/public blockchain on VANET.
Here, the vehicles, RSUs, and the authorities are participants of the network. This
framework uses incentives (ether) to reward the miners. Ether is Ethereum’s
cryptocurrency. The owners of the vehicles can exchange real world money for ether and
use the services. As Ethereum is public blockchain, any new vehicle can join the network
easily. However, this approach will use more power for computation as each message sent
by the vehicles is stored in the blockchain and will require mining as new blocks are added.
Further, Ethereum uses Proof of Stake as consensus where the miner is chosen based on
the number of ether, they have put at stake [21].
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In [29] Dai et al. has also used a permissionless blockchain, were all the vehicles are
participants of this system. Instead of storing the basic safety messages on the blockchain,
the vehicles will store their reputation score. This reputation score will be used by other
vehicles to authenticate the sender of the message. The reputation score is calculated using
indirect reciprocity principle, where a node increases its reputation if it helps other nodes
and decreases its reputation if it does not help the other nodes [30]. However, the
computational complexity for maintaining the reputation on the blockchain has not been
considered to see how useful this system will be in authenticating vehicles. Further, as a
greater number of vehicles join this system, it will be hard to reach consensus to add new
blocks.

In [31] Lasla et al. has also proposed a blockchain framework for VANET where vehicles,
RSUs and authorities form the participants of this framework. It will use PKI to assign
public keys and private keys to the vehicles. Here, each message is digitally signed using
the sender’s private key and the receiving vehicle will authenticate the message, by
verifying if the pubic key of the sender is available in blockchain and is indicated as valid.
Further, the integrity of the message is confirmed by verifying the digital signature using
the sender public key. Moreover, this paper also discusses on operations like revoking the
vehicles in case they misbehave in the network. The RSUs will act as the validators and
will be responsible for reaching the consensus. However, to verify performance of the
framework, Lasla et al. have used Bitcoin system. Bitcoin framework use Proof of Work
consensus, which is slow due to the high computational requirement to add new blocks
[21].

In [7] and [32], permissioned blockchains have been used with VANETs. In [7] Malik et
al. have used PKI to generate public and private keys for the vehicles. Using these keys,
the vehicles will authenticate themselves with the RSUs through encryption and
decryption. The pseudo ID of the vehicle is digitally signed by the CA and added as blocks
in the blockchain. However, these blockchains do not use smart contracts. Smart contracts
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are programs that automatically run on the blockchain and are used to ensure that all the
participants follow the agreement of blockchain usage [26]. Further, in [7] Proof of
Authority is used where the validator’s identity is kept at stake [33]. In [32] Lu et al. has
proposed a framework using 3 different blockchains with VANET; for storing the valid
certificates, revoked certificates and the messages transmitted by the vehicles. For
authenticating vehicles, their certificates are searched on the blockchain that stores valid
certificates and further searched on the blockchain that stores the revoked certificates. The
vehicle will be authenticated if its certificate is present in the former blockchain and absent
in the latter one. This shows that the vehicle has not been revoked after the certificate was
issued to it. Further, RSUs will act as validators of this framework and they use the Proof
of Work consensus, which requires high computation and more processing time [21]. Table
2.1 shows a brief description of each of the papers discussed above.

Table 2.1 Summary of related works

No.

Paper

Proposed Method

1.

Leiding et al. [28]

To deploy VANET using Ethereum blockchain technology
using Proof of Stake as consensus. The proposed system is
incentive based.

2.

Dai et al. [29]

To use Indirect Reciprocity to store the reputation of vehicles in
the blockchain. But have not considered the computational and
storage overhead for processing the reputation.

3.

Lasla et al. [31]

The blockchain framework has all entities like authorities, RSUs
and vehicles connected to the blockchain and RSUs act as the
validators for this network. The RSU lookup for authorization of
vehicles was tested using Bitcoin blockchain.

4.

Malik et al. [7]

Proposed a blockchain framework for VANET using PKI. The
blockchain uses Proof of Authority as consensus and provide
operations for initializing, registering, authenticating and
revoking vehicles. However, this blockchain does not use smart
contract or events.
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No.

Paper

Proposed Method

5.

Lu et al. [32]

The proposed framework has 3 different blockchains – for valid
certificates, revoked certificates, and messages send by the
vehicles. Law Enforcement Authority keeps the Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN) and public/private keys relation
and it is kept confidential to provide anonymous authentication.
RSUs act as the validators of the network and use Proof of Work
consensus.

Moreover, Table 2.2 shows how this research is different from the existing approaches.

Table 2.2 Comparison of different proposed methods

Property

Leiding et
al. [28]

Blockchain

Blockchain

Consensus

Simulation

Type

Participants

Used

Implemented

Ethereum -

Authorities,

Proof of

Permissionless RSU, vehicles

✖

Other

Incentive based
framework –

Stake

using Ether
Dai et al.

Permissionless Vehicles

Not

[29]

✔

mentioned

Indirect
reciprocity for
reputation

Lasla et al.
[31]

Bitcoin -

Authorities,

Proof of

Permissionless RSU, vehicles

✔

Work

Using PKI –
public and private
keys

Malik et al.

Permissioned

[7]

Authorities,

Proof of

RSU

Authority

✔

Using PKI –
public and private
keys

Lu et al. [32] Permissioned

Authorities

Proof of

(Law), RSU,

Work

vehicles

✔

3 blockchains,
reputation
evaluation
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Property

Blockchain

Blockchain

Consensus

Simulation

Type

Participants

Used

Implemented

Other

Proposed

Hyperledger

Authorities,

SOLO,

method in

Fabric -

RSU

Kafka or

queried to

Raft

validate the

this

Permissioned

research

✔

RSUs can be

vehicles

Apart from these proposed methods, there are additional literatures that have discussed the
use of blockchains in VANET. In [34], Lei et al., have discussed how blockchains can be
efficient than traditional PKI architecture with a trusted third party, specially when the
vehicles commute from one security domain to another. A security domain is the area
handled by security managers, who are responsible for managing the cryptographic keys
for the vehicles. When vehicles pass from one security domain to another, there are
additional operations required to authenticate the vehicle. The CAs at different security
domains will have to exchange the cryptographic keys of the vehicle and perform several
handshakes, making the key exchange inefficient. However, using blockchain can
eliminate this requirement, as the keys can be stored on the shared ledger and accessed by
all the participants.

In [35], Jiang et al., proposed a framework with blockchain in VANET, where five
blockchains are used based on the data stored on the blockchain. These different
blockchains also have different nodes as participants. Here, the Blockchain 1 is maintained
by the RSUs and their neighbors, Blockchain 2 is maintained by vehicles and RSUs,
Blockchain 3 is generated by RSU and the neighboring RSUs, Blockchain 4 is maintained
by RSUs and toll station nodes, and Blockchain 5 is maintained by vehicles, gas stations
and charging stations. However, as this framework has vehicles as a node, the transaction
rates and the time to reach consensus will be higher.
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In [36], Wang et al., have proposed a framework with two blockchains; one maintained by
the Registration Authorities and the other maintained by the Certificate Authorities. The
Registration Authority is responsible for encrypting vehicle identities and storing them,
while the Certificate Authority is responsible for generating the certificates related to the
authentication details and other digital certificates. However, this framework was not tested
or simulated for checking the performance of the system. In [37] Decoster et al., proposed
a blockchain based framework in VANET making the system forensic ready while
maintaining the privacy of the users. Here, vehicles are a part of the blockchain and will
store the hash of the messages along with the digital signature of the sending vehicle. This
will enable the ledger to be forensic ready, as the node that generates the message will have
its digital signature in the blockchain along with the hash of the message.

In this thesis, we have used permissioned blockchain – Hyperledger Fabric [13] which is
an emerging blockchain technology. Here, the participants of the blockchain system are
RSUs and authorities. We have used pseudo IDs along with PKI public and private keys.
The RSUs will be assisting the vehicles to authenticate other vehicles by providing a quick
look-up for the pseudo IDs assigned to the vehicles and checking if the public key assigned
to the vehicles are valid. Further, as discussed previously in section 2.3.2, Hyperledger
Fabric has a plug-in to incorporate different consensus mechanisms like SOLO, Kafka or
Raft.
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Chapter 3
3. Proposed Method
3.1 Introduction
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) have great potential in improving traffic control
and mitigating road accidents. This is done by sending messages or basic safety messages
(BSMs) between vehicles (V2V communication) or between vehicles and road side units
(RSUs) (V2I communication).

Security is one of the main challenges in VANET. This is crucial because it directly affects
the lives of the commuters or incurs a substantial financial loss to them. As discussed in
section 2.1.3, there are many security concerns and different potential attacks that could
take place in VANET. Authentication is one of these security requirements that is very
crucial for validating the messages from a sending vehicle. It is important to improve the
efficiency of the authentication scheme so that a higher number of messages can be
validated by the vehicles, which will, in turn, ensure that critical safety messages are not
dropped due to the delay in the authentication.

The traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) architecture used with VANET includes
encryption and decryption to generate and validate the digital certificates attached along
with BSMs. This will result in more delay to authenticate the node sending messages. As
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discussed in section 2.2, below are the main steps included in authenticating the messages
sent by other vehicles:
•

On receiving each BSM, the receiving vehicle uses the public key of the CA (PKCA)
stored in its on-board unit (OBU) during registration, to validate the certificate of
the sending vehicle, CertV. The format of the CertV is given in equation 2.1. It
contains the public key of the sending vehicle, digitally signed using the private
key of the CA, SKCA. Hence, the public key of the CA, PKCA is used to verify it.

•

After verifying the certificate of the sending vehicle, its public key (PKV) is used
to verify the digital signature attached along with the BSM. The format of a BSM
is represented by equation 2.2. To verify the digital signature that was generated
using the private key of the sender, the public key of the sender is used.

Both above-mentioned processes that validate the digital signatures require considerable
computation for verifying them using the respective public keys. Hence, in our proposed
framework, we have implemented a light-weight authentication scheme for VANET.
Instead of using the traditional PKI, which uses public keys, private keys, and certificates
for the nodes, we have used this along with a permissioned blockchain. We have proposed
the use of pseudo IDs along with public keys to provide a quick look-up for authentication
from RSUs. Further, this framework is implemented on Hyperledger Fabric, implementing
VANET in a decentralized and distributed fashion. Blockchains provide an immutable
record of information and an append-only database, ensuring traceability and transparency
of data.

3.2 Synopsis of Authentication using Blockchain
Many authors have discussed the use of blockchains in VANET for validating messages
and maintaining the registration and revocation of vehicles [31], [28], [32], [7], and [29].
Some of these approaches use public blockchains like Bitcoin [31] and Ethereum [28].
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They use consensus mechanisms like Proof of Work, which is a relatively slow consensus
algorithm [21]. Hence, there will be a delay in updating data on the blockchain for all the
ledgers and will lead to a slower system. This will adversely affect the efficiency of basic
safety messages being authenticated and received by other vehicles on the network.

Some of the papers mentioned in section 2.4, have used PKI architecture. In this
framework, public and private keys are used for encryption and decryption functions, and
to generate and verify digital signatures. However, this leads to higher processing time and
delays due to the computation time required for encryption and decryption. Further, in our
research we use blockchain technology with the public and private keys. Here, the pseudo
IDs and the public keys of the vehicles are stored in the shared ledger across all the
participants (RSUs and authorities). The architectures in [29], [31], [32], and [28], have
each vehicle in the network as participants of the blockchain. While this provides shared
ledger access to the vehicles, it also reduces the performance of the blockchain due to more
participants in the network. As the number of participants increase, the processing time to
reach consensus also increases. Further, storing the shared ledger on each vehicle in the
blockchain network will increase the storage overhead in vehicles. Thus, in our research
we have the authorities and RSUs as participants of our blockchain, and not the vehicles.

Further, in [7], one of the parameters used for evaluating the performance of the proposed
method is the delay in the RSU communication measured in milliseconds (ms). This
parameter is also our primary focus for measuring the performance of the proposed lightweight authentication framework using Hyperledger Fabric and pseudo IDs. We aim to
compare our results to the traditional PKI architecture using Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). We have used ECDSA as it is widely used across VANET
due to the high security provided in less key size [38].
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3.3 Architecture of Proposed Method
In our proposed architecture, we use Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned blockchain,
developed under the Hyperledger project. As discussed in section 2.3.2, Hyperledger
Fabric implements a decentralized and distributed framework. The participant of the
blockchain network are the Authentication Parties and the RSUs. Through this proposed
method, we aim to accomplish the following:
•

Provide a decentralized and distributed framework for VANET

•

Provide a light-weight authentication scheme using pseudo IDs, public/private
keys and digital signatures

•

Provide transactions to register, validate, and revoke vehicles

Figure 3.1 Proposed architecture

Figure 3.1 shows the participants in the proposed framework. The Authentication Parties
and the RSUs have access to the blockchain. However, the RSUs are provided read-only
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access to the shared ledger, while the Authentication Parties are given full access so that
they can submit transactions to update the ledger.

In this type of decentralized network, we have more than one Authentication Parties, so
that owners of the vehicles in different regions can register with their nearest
Authentication Party. Further, as the ledger is distributed, the vehicle’s registration in the
network is visible to all the participants (other authorities and RSUs) and not just the
authority registering the vehicle. This accounts for better network scalability as new
vehicles can easily join the network and do not need to register again with another authority
in case they commute to a region or domain maintained by another Authentication Party.

The owners of the vehicles register them in VANET by going to the nearest Authentication
Party. As a part of registration, each vehicle receives a set of pseudo IDs along with a set
of public-private key pairs using ECDSA. The pseudo ID is used as the sender ID in basic
safety messages. The public key along with the pseudo ID of the vehicles are stored in the
blockchain to provide a quick look-up for the RSUs to validate the vehicles in the network.
Each time a vehicle receives a message in VANET, the pseudo ID in the message is verified
with the RSU to check if the sender has a valid public key in the blockchain. The vehicle
also maintains a short list of valid pseudo IDs and public keys of its recent neighboring
nodes, to reduce the communication overhead in transmitting messages to the RSU. This
list is maintained along with an expiration time for the recorded pseudo IDs and public
keys to ensure that old entries are deleted.

3.3.1

Assumptions

Our proposed method has few assumptions. They are listed below:
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•

We assume that the Authentication Parties issuing the cryptographic keys like the
public and private key pairs, and the pseudo IDs for the vehicles, and the road side
units (RSUs) will not be compromised by the attacker.

•

We also assume that there is an RSU within the range of each vehicle to assist with
the authentication of other vehicle’s messages.

•

We assume that the RSUs have enough computational power to assist the vehicles
requesting to validate other vehicles and for verifying the message integrity by
validating the digital signature in the messages received by the RSU. Further, the
vehicles too have enough power to perform the necessary computations.

3.3.2

Operations at different nodes

There are mainly three different types of nodes in our proposed model. They are the
Authentication Parties, RSUs and the vehicles. Below are the functions taking place at
these nodes.

Authentication Party:
•

The owners of the vehicles register them with the nearest Authentication Party by
providing the vehicle’s unique 17-character Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)
[39].

•

The Authentication Party then generates a set of public-private key pairs and
pseudo IDs (PKV, SKV and PIDV) for each vehicle.

•

Then this information is submitted as a Registration transaction to the blockchain,
which is further discussed in section 3.3.3 below. Once the transaction is submitted
to the blockchain, the data is available to other participants of the blockchain; i.e.
RSUs and other Authentication Parties.

•

We have used the default consensus of SOLO, where there is one ordering node
that will order the blocks in the blockchain and update all the ledgers in the
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blockchain. However, this is not fault-tolerant and is only used for simulation
purposes. More research is required to choose a fast and fault-tolerant algorithm for
reaching consensus.
•

The RSUs will contact the Authentication Party to report a vehicle that is
compromised, and the Authentication Party will execute the Misbehaviour
transaction as discussed in section 3.3.3 below.

RSU:
•

The RSUs will have access to the shared ledger and hence, can access the most
updated information on vehicles. However, they have read-only access to the ledger
and cannot send transactions to the blockchain.

•

When the RSUs receive a BSM, it checks if the PIDV and the PKV of the vehicle V
is valid in the blockchain and if valid then, the signature of the message is validated,
by retrieving the corresponding public key from the ledger.

•

However, if the PIDV or the PKV are invalid in the blockchain or if the message
signature is invalid then, the RSU suspects that the vehicle identity might be
compromised and then report it to the Authentication Party.

•

The vehicles in the network will also request services from the RSU to authenticate
the sender of the message. The RSUs will receive the PIDV and PKV of the sender
from the requesting vehicle and will check if that PIDV and PKV are present in the
blockchain with valid status. The result of the validation is then broadcasted to all
the vehicles.

Vehicle:
•

During the time of registration, each vehicle receives a set of pseudo IDs,
public/private key pairs (PIDV, PKV and SKV respectively) from the Authentication
Party.
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•

When a vehicle sends a BSM, it sends additional information like its pseudo ID
(PIDV), public key (PKV), and the digital signature of the message generated using
the private key of the vehicle (SKV). This is represented by equation 3.1, where M
is the basic safety message (BSM), T is the timestamp, SignSKv(M) is the digital
signature generated using the private key, SKV.

𝑉 → 𝑀, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑆𝐾𝑉 (𝑀|𝑇), 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑉 , 𝑃𝐾𝑉

•

3.1

When a BSM is received, the vehicle will verify the PIDV and PKV of the sender in
the list of valid PIDs and PKs maintained locally. If the PIDV and PKV are
recognized as valid and the signature is verified, then the sender is authenticated. If
PIDV and PKV are unknown, the vehicle will send a request to the RSU nearby to
verify the PIDV and PKV, and if validated then it is added to the vehicle’s local list
of valid PIDV and PKV along with an expiration time.

•

When the vehicles query the RSU to validate the PIDV and PKV of a vehicle, it
waits till the channel is free and listens if other vehicles query the same PIDV and
PKV to the RSU and receives a reply. If no other vehicle query for the same PIDV
then, the vehicle requests the RSU to validate it.

3.3.3

Operations using Blockchain

The primary operations done using the blockchain are the following:
•

Registration – the owners of the vehicles are required to register them with the
nearest authority. The authority records the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)
of the vehicle, which is a 17-character unique identification for each vehicle [39].
Further, the authority issues a set of pseudo IDs (PIDs) for the vehicle that are used
as the identity of the vehicle in VANET. The Authentication Party maintains a
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mapping between the VIN and the set of PIDs assigned to each vehicle. Further, a
set of public-private key pairs (PK/SK) are also generated using ECDSA and
communicated in secure manner to the vehicle. The shared ledger is then updated
with the vehicle’s PID and PK, and all the other authorities and RSU know that the
vehicle is registered in the system.
•

Misbehavior Report – when the RSUs detect a compromised vehicle or if there is a
suspicious vehicle in the network, then the RSUs send this vehicle’s pseudo ID to
the nearest Authentication Party, and the authority submits this transaction.

•

Revocation – if the misbehavior report exceeds a certain threshold, for example,
three, then this transaction is automatically called to revoke the vehicle from the
network. The data related to the vehicle is not deleted from the blockchain but
updated to reflect that the vehicle is invalid in the network.

•

Readmission – When a revoked vehicle’s owner approaches the authority to register
back to the system, this transaction is called to readmit the vehicle to the network.
The vehicle will be provided with a set of pseudo IDs (PIDs) and public/private
keys (PK/SK). The PIDs and the PKs are updated on the blockchain to indicate as
valid in the network.

•

Query – this is used by the RSUs to check if a vehicle is valid in the network based
on the PID and PK of the vehicle.

Table 3.1 Blockchain operations

Operation

Sender

Transaction

Registration

Authentication

<VIN, PID>

Party

<PID, PK, Status, Misbehavior Report>

Authentication

<PID, RSUID, ++Misbehavior Report>

Misbehavior Report

Party
Revocation

(automatically

<PID, Status>

invoked)
Readmission

Authentication

<*VIN, PID>

Party

<PID, PK, Status, Misbehavior Report>
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Operation

Sender

Transaction

Query_Valid_Vehicles

RSU

<select the vehicle with a PID and ‘valid’ status>

These operations are mentioned in detail with their transaction format in Table 3.1. The
Registration transaction records the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and assigns a set
of pseudo IDs (PIDs). Further, the set of public keys (PKs) generated using ECDSA are
also stored on the blockchain with the PID, status of the vehicle, and misbehavior report.
During registration, each vehicle is recorded with ‘valid’ as Status and is assigned zero as
Misbehavior Reports.

In the Misbehavior Report transaction, for the current vehicle’s PID, the Misbehavior
Report count is incremented, and the RSU that reported it is also recorded. If the
misbehavior reports exceed more than three (for example), then the Revocation transaction
is called automatically. This transaction updates the current vehicle’s Status as ‘invalid’.
For the Readmission transaction, the vehicle’s owner goes to the nearest authority, and the
authority updates the ledger to indicate the Status of the current vehicle as ‘valid’. The
current vehicle is indicated by *VIN. It also updates the vehicle to have a set of new PIDs,
and public/private key pairs. The Misbehavior Report for that vehicle is also updated to
zero. The query, Query_Valid_Vehicles, is used by the RSUs to retrieve a list of valid PIDs
of the vehicles in the blockchain. This list is checked when the vehicles request the RSUs
to authenticate another vehicle’s PIDs.

As shown in Figure 3.2, the RSUs are only provided access to query the ledger and retrieve
the valid PIDs and PKs of the vehicles in the network. This ensures a light-weight
authentication scheme as compared to the traditional PKI approach. Further, Figure 3.2
shows the different transactions performed by the Authentication Party in the blockchain
like Registration, Misbehavior Report, and Readmission.
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Figure 3.2 Different operations in the proposed framework

3.4 High Level Outline of Authentication
Figure 3.3 shows the flowchart used in our proposed method for authenticating the sender
of a message. Each vehicle in the network uses its pseudo ID (PID) to indicate the sender
of the message and attaches the public key (PK) and the digital signature of the message
generated using its private key.

The receiving vehicles use the sender’s PID to authenticate the messages received. Each
vehicle in the network maintains a small list of valid PIDs and corresponding PKs with an
expiration time for its nearby nodes. If the sender’s PID is not present in this list, then the
vehicle will request the nearby RSU to validate the sender’s PID and PK.

The RSUs being a part of the blockchain can request a query to check if a vehicle is valid
in the World State database or not. In this way, authentication of vehicles is a quick lookup for its PID in the retrieved query. Thus, we have a light-weight authentication
mechanism.
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Further, the digital signature of the message is verified using the public key attached along
with the message. The sender of the BSM is authenticated if its PID and the digital
signature of the message is validated successfully.

Figure 3.3 Flowchart of authentication process in vehicles
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Chapter 4

4. Results and Simulation
4.1 Simulation
In our research we have used several open source software to simulate the road traffic
network and to record different parameters. To simulate the network, we have used
OMNET++ 5.3 [40], which is an extensible, modular, component-based C++ network
simulator. We have used SUMO 0.32.0, which will provide road traffic simulation package
for large road networks [41]. Further, we have used Veins 4.7.1 [42] to connect the network
simulator, OMNET++, and the road traffic simulator, SUMO, to provide inter vehicle
communication.

To implement the permissioned blockchain framework, we have used Hyperledger
Composer [43], which is an open source framework for developing blockchain
applications. Hyperledger Composer will support the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain as
shown in Figure 4.1. The Model File will contain all the assets, participants and the
transaction types in the network. The Script File will contain the logic for the transactions
in the blockchain. The Access Control File will specify the access provided for each
participant of the blockchain, and the Query file will include the queries that we need for
our blockchain framework. The code for the respective files is given in APPENDIX A.
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Figure 4.1 Structure of Hyperledger Composer [44]

Hyperledger Composer provides a REST API for web applications. In order to connect the
OMNET++ application to the Hyperledger Composer REST API, we have used the
cpprestsdk [45] external library. Moreover, we have also used Crypto++ [46] library to
implement the PKI architecture with Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
We have used this to compare our proposed model. We have also used the ECDSA public
and private keys using Crypto++ in our proposed method.

In our proposed framework, we have two types of messages being transmitted: Basic Safety
Messages (BSMs) and Wave Service Advertisements (WSAs). The parameters that we
examine to compare our method with the traditional PKI architecture, are the delay due to
authentication and the channel busy time. Table 4.1 shows the computer setup for our
simulation.

Table 4.1 Experimentation Setup

CPU

Intel® Core™ i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz

CPU-cache

8512 KB

RAM

7.7 GB
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4.1.1

Simulation Setup

Table 4.2 Simulation Parameters

Simulation time

150 seconds

Frequency

5.9 GHz

No. of nodes

50

Size of ground

2500 m

Physical Layer

IEEE 802.11p

Mac Layer

IEEE 1609.4

Measured Parameters

Delay due to Authentication, Channel Busy
Time, BSM Packet Size, Message Overhead

The SUMO route file included within the OMNET++ application will indicate how the
simulation will behave. The route file for our simulation is included in APPENDIX B. It
will indicate how frequently the nodes are being created, the path they will traverse, and
the map used. The ini file in OMNET++ will indicate the simulation parameters. Table 4.2
indicates the simulation parameters that we have used. APPENDIX C shows the ini file
that we have used in our simulation.

In our simulation, nodes are added every 3 seconds. Once a vehicle is generated in SUMO,
a daemon process, sumo-launchd.py, will continuously listen to the requests and generate
the corresponding node in OMNET++. Vehicles are generated with a maximum speed of
50 km/hr and will be generated from one point and will keep travelling through the road at
maximum speed till they reach the end of the road. If the vehicle encounters traffic, it either
slows down or takes an alternate route. Once the road ends, the vehicle stops transmitting
messages and the finish() function is called, which is used for data collection.
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4.1.2

Simulation Runs

In our simulation we have used one scenario. Figure 4.2 shows the map that is used for our
simulation. We have recorded the parameters for our simulation at different times when
the nodes generated were 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50.

Figure 4.2 Scenario: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany

To compare our proposed method, we have simulated the same scenario with that of a
traditional PKI framework in VANET as discussed in section 2.2. In our proposed method,
each vehicle on receiving a BSM will check if the PIDV and the PKV is present in the local
list with valid expiration time. If not, then the RSU is contacted to verify the PIDV and PKV
if the channel is free. If the channel is busy, then the node waits for some time (we used 5
seconds) and then verifies the PIDV and PKV with the RSU. After verifying the PIDV and
PKV, the digital signature of the message is validated using the PKV. The RSU has access
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to the blockchain to query and validate the PID and PK of vehicles. Both the approaches
are examined for the delay that was caused due to the authentication framework and the
channel busy time. Further, we have compared the BSM packet size in both the approaches
and the additional message overhead in our approach for vehicles to request RSU services
and the RSUs response back to the vehicle that is broadcasted as a WSA (WAVE Service
Advertisement).

4.2 Result
Here, we analyse the results of our simulation. We have compared our proposed method to
the traditional PKI framework and recorded the delay that was caused due to
authentication, the channel busy time, and the BSM packet size difference and the
additional message overhead in our proposed method.

4.2.1

Delay in Authentication

To study the efficiency of our proposed method, we recorded the delay in real-time for
authentication. This is the time spend in seconds by each vehicle in the network receiving
a BSM, to authenticate the sender of the BSM. We calculated this by using the clock()
function provided by the ctime library. The summation of the duration for authenticating
each BSM in the simulation is recorded when the vehicles on the road are 5, 10, up to 50
vehicles.

We calculated the average delay caused due to authentication, per BSM, by dividing the
summation of the delay for authenticating all the BSMs (for simulation time – 150 seconds
when the number of vehicles is 50) by the total number of BSMs transmitted in the network.
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As shown in Figure 4.3, we can see that the average delay per BSM to authenticate the
sender is approximately 1.9 ms using the proposed method, whereas using the PKI
framework, it is approximately 3.6 ms. This is due to the additional computational time
required for validating two digital signatures in the PKI approach, one for the PKV in the
certificate, and the other for the transmitted message. In our proposed method, this
computation time is reduced to half by using RSU services to validate the PKV using
blockchain, and then verifying the digital signature in the message. Thus, our proposed
method provides a light-weight authentication framework using blockchain.

Average delay due to authentication per BSM
4
3.5

Time (ms)

3
2.5
2

1.5
1
0.5
0
Delay due to authentication for a BSM

Proposed Method

PKI Framework

Figure 4.3 Average delay in authentication for a BSM

Further, we recorded the total delay caused due to authentication, for all BSMs, in the
network as the vehicles increase in the simulation. As shown in Figure 4.4, we see that the
total delay for authenticating all the BSMs in our proposed method is approximately half
the delay in the traditional PKI framework. Thus, our proposed method will effectively
reduce the computational time required for authentication by half of that in traditional PKI
approach.
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Figure 4.4 Total Delay due to authentication

4.2.2

Channel Busy Time

The channel busy time is the amount of time the MAC layer was busy due to congestion.
The totalBusyTime is a scalar value recorded by Veins 4.7.1 framework and dividing it by
the total simulation time will give the channel busy time in seconds.

As shown in Figure 4.5, we see that the proposed method has higher channel busy time of
0.11 seconds at simulation time 150 seconds, when compared to the PKI approach, which
has 0.05 seconds. This is because of the additional communication to the RSUs, required
to validate the PID and the PK of the senders. Additionally, the RSUs will broadcast a
WSA when a vehicle requests to validate PID and PK. This has resulted in the increase in
the channel busy time.
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Figure 4.5 Channel busy time

4.2.3

BSM Packet Size

When comparing the BSM packet size in both the approaches, the PKI framework will
have an additional certificate when compared to the size of the BSM in our proposed
approach. In the simulations, the BSM packet size for the PKI approach is 235 bytes,
including the digital signature of the message (64 bytes), and the certificate that contains
the public key of the sending vehicle (65 bytes) and the digital signature of it (64 bytes).
However, when compared to our proposed approach, the size of the BSM packet is 171
bytes. The BSM in our blockchain approach does not require the 64-byte digital signature
of the public key. It contains the PID of the vehicle within the BSM and additionally the
signature of the message (64 bytes) and the public key of the vehicle (65 bytes). This is
shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of different BSM packet size

4.2.4

Additional Messages Send

Messages transmitted in our proposed model
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Figure 4.7 Additional messages transmitted in our proposed method

Further, we examined the additional overhead in our approach to communicate the queries
to the RSU and the RSU response back to the vehicle, as a WAVE Service Advertisement
(WSA), that is broadcasted to all the nearby nodes. Figure 4.7 shows the number of requests
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that were send to the RSUs by the vehicles and the number of WSAs that was broadcasted
to the vehicles and the number of BSMs in the network.
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Chapter 5

5. Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The motivation to provide a light weight authentication framework that was
computationally efficient compared to the traditional PKI architecture, is realized using the
blockchain framework. In our proposed framework, we validate the PID and PK of the
vehicles sending messages using the RSU services. The vehicles also maintain a short list
of recently validated vehicles (PID and PK) with an expiration time. After validating the
PID and the PK of the sending vehicle, we then validate the digital signature of the BSM
along with the timestamp that the message was send. The RSUs will have access to the
blockchain and will query it to validate the PID and PK of the vehicles.

Our proposed method reduces the computational time for authentication, but this is done
by sacrificing the channel busy time. Our proposed method will require additional
messages to be transmitted to the RSUs and further, from the RSUs to the vehicles. Hence,
this results in the additional channel busy time. However, we were able to reduce the delay
due to authentication by half of that in the PKI framework. Further, using blockchains will
enable a decentralized and distributed system for VANET, avoiding single point of failure.
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5.2 Future Work
Channel congestion is a drawback in our proposed approach as mentioned in section 4.2.2.
There are many approaches to control and improve the channel congestion. Some of these
approaches can be used to check if this will reduce the channel congestion in the blockchain
framework.

Further, reaching consensus is a challenging task in blockchains. There are various
consensus algorithms that are quick and efficient and can be used to improve the proposed
framework. Moreover, detecting a misbehaving node and reporting it to the Authentication
Party requires more research. More studies need to be done to find efficient ways to detect
the compromised nodes and the attackers in the network and revoke them from the network.
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APPENDIX A
Hyperledger Composer Files
Model File:
namespace org.example.basic
asset VehicleReg identified by VIN {
o

String VIN

o

String PID

o

String PID2

o

String PID3

}
asset Vehicle identified by PID {
o

String PID

o

String PK

o

String status

o

Integer misbehaviourRpt

}
participant AuthenticationParty identified by authID {
o String authID
o String name
}
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participant RSU identified by RSUID {
o String RSUID
o String name
}
transaction Misbehaviour {
--> Vehicle car
o String RSUID
}
transaction Revocation {
--> Vehicle car
}
transaction Readmission {
--> VehicleReg car
o Long pseudo1
o

Long pseudo2

o

Long pseudo3

}

Script File:
'use strict';
/**
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* Sample transaction processor function.
* @param {org.vanet1.mynetwork.Misbehavior} mb The sample transaction instance.
* @transaction
*/
async function Misbehavior(mb) { // eslint-disable-line no-unused-vars
mb.car.misbehaviorRpt++;
// If the misbehaviour report is more than 3 then the vehicle is revoked.
if(mb.car.misbehaviorRpt >= 3){
mb.car.status = "revoked";
}
// Get the asset registry for the asset.
const assetRegistry = await getAssetRegistry('org.vanet1.mynetwork.Vehicle');
// Update the asset in the asset registry.
await assetRegistry.update(mb.car);
}
/**
* Sample transaction processor function.
* @param {org.vanet1.mynetwork.Revocation} rv The sample transaction instance.
* @transaction
*/
async function Revocation(rv) { // eslint-disable-line no-unused-vars
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rv.car.status = "revoked";
// Get the asset registry for the asset.
const assetRegistry = await getAssetRegistry('org.vanet1.mynetwork.Vehicle');
// Update the asset in the asset registry.
await assetRegistry.update(rv.car);
}
/**
* Sample transaction processor function.
* @param {org.vanet1.mynetwork.Readmission} ra The sample transaction instance.
* @transaction
*/
async function Readmission(ra) { // eslint-disable-line no-unused-vars
ra.car.PID = ra.pseudo1;
ra.car.PID2 = ra.pseudo2;
ra.car.PID3 = ra.pseudo3;
// Get the asset registry for the asset.
const assetRegistry = await getAssetRegistry('org.vanet1.mynetwork.VehicleReg');
// Update the asset in the asset registry.
await assetRegistry.update(ra.car);
}
Access Control File:
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rule EverybodyCanReadEverything {
description: "Allow all participants read access to all resources"
participant: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.*"
operation: READ
resource: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.*"
action: ALLOW
}
rule AuthPartyCanSubmitTransactions {
description: "Allow all participants to submit transactions"
participant: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.AuthParty"
operation: CREATE
resource: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.*"
action: ALLOW
}
rule AuthPartyCanUpdateTransactions {
description: "Allow all participants to submit transactions"
participant: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.AuthParty"
operation: UPDATE
resource: "org.vanet1.mynetwork.*"
action: ALLOW
}
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rule SystemACL {
description: "System ACL to permit all access"
participant: "org.hyperledger.composer.system.Participant"
operation: ALL
resource: "org.hyperledger.composer.system.**"
action: ALLOW
}
rule NetworkAdminUser {
description: "Grant business network administrators full access to user resources"
participant: "org.hyperledger.composer.system.NetworkAdmin"
operation: ALL
resource: "**"
action: ALLOW
}
rule NetworkAdminSystem {
description: "Grant business network administrators full access to system resources"
participant: "org.hyperledger.composer.system.NetworkAdmin"
operation: ALL
resource: "org.hyperledger.composer.system.**"
action: ALLOW
}
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Query File:
query selectAllValidVehicles {
description: "Select all vehilces that have valid status"
statement:
SELECT org.vanet1.mynetwork.Vehicle
WHERE (PID == _$PIDParam AND status =='valid')
}
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APPENDIX B
SUMO Configuration
SUMO Route Configuration:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<routes>
<vType color="1,1,0" maxSpeed="14" minGap="2.5" length="2.5" sigma="0.5"
decel="4.5" accel="2.6" id="vtype0"/>
<route id="route0" edges="-39539626 -5445204#2 -5445204#1 113939244#2 126606716 23339459 30405358#1 85355912 85355911#0 85355911#1 30405356
5931612 30350450#0 30350450#1 30350450#2 4006702#0 4006702#1 4900043
4900041#1"/>
<flow id="flow0" number="195" period="3" begin="0" route="route0" type="vtype0"/>
</routes>

SUMO Configuration:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<configuration xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://sumo.sf.net/xsd/sumoConfiguration.xsd">
<input>
<net-file value="erlangen.net.xml"/>
<route-files value="erlangen.rou.xml"/>
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<additional-files value="erlangen.poly.xml"/>
</input>
<time>
<begin value="0"/>
<end value="1000"/>
<step-length value="0.1"/>
</time>
<report>
<no-step-log value="true"/>
</report>
<gui_only>
<start value="true"/>
</gui_only>
</configuration>
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APPENDIX C
OMNET Configuration
[General]
cmdenv-express-mode = true
cmdenv-autoflush = true
cmdenv-status-frequency = 1s
**.cmdenv-log-level = info
ned-path = .
image-path = ../../images
network = RSUExampleScenario
##########################################################
#

Simulation parameters

#

##########################################################
debug-on-errors = true
print-undisposed = true
sim-time-limit = 149s
**.scalar-recording = true
**.vector-recording = false
**.debug = false
**.coreDebug = false
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*.playgroundSizeX = 2500m
*.playgroundSizeY = 2500m
*.playgroundSizeZ = 50m
##########################################################
# Annotation parameters

#

##########################################################
*.annotations.draw = true
##########################################################
# Obstacle parameters

#

##########################################################
*.obstacles.debug = false
*.obstacles.obstacles = xmldoc("config.xml",
"//AnalogueModel[@type='SimpleObstacleShadowing']/obstacles")
##########################################################
#

TraCIScenarioManager parameters

#

##########################################################
*.manager.updateInterval = 1s
*.manager.host = "localhost"
*.manager.port = 9999
*.manager.autoShutdown = true
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*.manager.launchConfig = xmldoc("erlangen.launchd.xml")
##########################################################
#

RSU SETTINGS

#

##########################################################
*.rsu[0].mobility.x = 2000
*.rsu[0].mobility.y = 2000
*.rsu[0].mobility.z = 3
*.rsu[*].applType = "TraCIDemoRSU11p"
#*.rsu[*].applType = "MyVeinsApp"
*.rsu[*].appl.headerLength = 80 bit
*.rsu[*].appl.sendBeacons = false
*.rsu[*].appl.dataOnSch = false
*.rsu[*].appl.beaconInterval = 1s
*.rsu[*].appl.beaconUserPriority = 7
*.rsu[*].appl.dataUserPriority = 5
##########################################################
#

11p specific parameters

#

NIC-Settings

#
#

##########################################################
*.connectionManager.sendDirect = true
*.connectionManager.maxInterfDist = 2600m
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*.connectionManager.drawMaxIntfDist = false
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.useServiceChannel = false
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.txPower = 20mW
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.bitrate = 6Mbps
*.**.nic.phy80211p.sensitivity = -89dBm
*.**.nic.phy80211p.useThermalNoise = true
*.**.nic.phy80211p.thermalNoise = -110dBm
*.**.nic.phy80211p.decider = xmldoc("config.xml")
*.**.nic.phy80211p.analogueModels = xmldoc("config.xml")
*.**.nic.phy80211p.usePropagationDelay = true
*.**.nic.phy80211p.antenna = xmldoc("antenna.xml", "/root/Antenna[@id='monopole']")
##########################################################
#

WaveAppLayer

#

##########################################################
*.node[*].applType = "TraCIDemo11p"
*.node[*].appl.headerLength = 80 bit
*.node[*].appl.sendBeacons = false
*.node[*].appl.dataOnSch = false
*.node[*].appl.beaconInterval = 1s
##########################################################
#

Mobility

#
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##########################################################
*.node[*].veinsmobilityType.debug = true
*.node[*].veinsmobility.x = 0
*.node[*].veinsmobility.y = 0
*.node[*].veinsmobility.z = 1.895
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentCount = 1
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentStart = 75s
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentDuration = 50s
[Config Default]
[Config WithBeaconing]
*.rsu[*].appl.sendBeacons = true
*.node[*].appl.sendBeacons = true
[Config WithChannelSwitching]
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.useServiceChannel = true
*.node[*].appl.dataOnSch = true
*.rsu[*].appl.dataOnSch = true
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APPENDIX D
Scalar Results

Following tables show the values that are depicted as results in section 4.2, that were
calculated at 95% confidence interval:

Table D. 1 Scalar results for the proposed method

No. of
No. of BSMs
Vehicles transmitted
5

80 ± 0

Delay (s) at the RSU for
authentication (Proposed
Method)
0.1932882 ± 0.00397563

Channel Busy Time

10

810 ± 0

1.660304 ± 0.005156857

0.006588 ± 0

15

2882 ± 0

5.685357 ± 0.008248879

0.015067 ± 0

20

6206 ± 0

12.1682 ± 0.01181723

0.025109 ± 0

25

10702 ± 0

20.99469 ± 0.027719451

0.035964 ± 0

30

16425 ± 0

32.2156 ± 0.029478858

0.046644 ± 0

35

23236 ± 0

45.38536 ± 0.050937656

0.058999 ± 0

40

31110 ± 0

60.74598 ± 0.059365638

0.069437 ± 0

45

42593 ± 0

82.98144 ± 0.092097726

0.084559 ± 0

50

57310 ± 75.72

111.543 ± 0.218990367

0.107741 ± 0.000563567

0.001631± 0

Table D. 2 Scalar results for PKI framework

No. of
No. of BSMs
Vehicles transmitted
5

80 ± 0

Delay (s) at the RSU for
authentication (PKI
framework)
0.3259969 ± 0.004499773

10

810 ± 0

3.033661 ± 0.009265854
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Channel Busy Time

0.00422 ± 0

0.001057 ± 0

No. of
No. of BSMs
Vehicles transmitted
15

2882 ± 0

Delay (s) at the RSU for
authentication (PKI
framework)
10.58086 ± 0.009066658

Channel Busy Time

20

6206 ± 0

22.5322 ± 0.028489313

0.014754 ± 0

25

10702 ± 0

38.93532 ± 0.055155

0.020124 ± 0

30

16425 ± 0

59.77887 ± 0.089139

0.025574 ± 0

35

23236 ± 0

84.7998 ± 0.126409699

0.032525 ± 0

40

31110 ± 0

113.353 ± 0.143286621

0.037502 ± 0

45

42593 ± 0

154.5038 ± 0.204529479

0.044884 ± 0

50

57424 ± 0

207.7973 ± 0.27740337

0.054312 ± 0

0.009352 ± 0

Table D. 3 Message overhead for the proposed method

No. of
Vehicles

No. of BSMs
transmitted

No. of WSAs
Broadcasted

80 ± 0

No. of
Requests/Queries to
RSU
20 ± 0

5
10

810 ± 0

90 ± 0

54 ± 0

15

2882 ± 0

288 ± 2.36537

134 ± 2.268432229

20

6206 ± 0

716 ± 5.297721148

291 ± 5.128110656

25

10702 ± 0

1514 ± 9.018416117

551 ± 8.038707739

30

16425 ± 0

2699 ± 11.65956171

880 ± 13.65147238

35

23236 ± 0

4296 ± 27.40604414

1248 ± 14.10319886

40

31110 ± 0

6480 ± 39.52529427

1737 ± 26.47883707

45

42593 ± 0

10566 ± 32.05964375

2316 ± 25.59294239

50

57310 ± 75.72

18121 ± 116.5713289

2949 ± 36.33726741
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14 ± 0
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